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Abstract
A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a ﬁxed
amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly
prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent’s bundle. Under fairness, eﬃciency
is equivalent to budget-balance (all the available money is allocated among the agents).
Budget-balance and fairness in general are incompatible with non-manipulability (Green
and Laﬀont, 1979). We propose a new notion of the degree of manipulability which can be
used to compare the ease of manipulation in allocation mechanisms. Our measure counts
for each problem the number of agents who can manipulate the rule. Given this notion,
the main result demonstrates that maximally linked fair allocation rules are the minimally
manipulable rules among all budget-balanced and fair allocation mechanisms. Such rules
link any agent to the bundle of a pre-selected agent through indiﬀerences (which can be
viewed as indirect egalitarian equivalence).
JEL Classiﬁcation: C71, C78, D63, D71, D78.
Key Words: Minimal manipulability, fairness, budget-balance, allocation rules.
1 Introduction
Many real-life problems involve the allocation of indivisible objects among agents through
price or compensation mechanisms. Examples include the simultaneous allocation of jobs
among workers together with theirs salaries on labor markets and the assignment of apart-
ments together with their rents on housing markets. The fundamental criterion employed in
these problems is fairness meaning each agent likes his own consumption bundle (consisting of
an object and a monetary compensation) at least as well as that of anyone else. These types
of problems are sometimes referred to as fair (or envy-free) allocation problems and have
received considerable attention in the literature, see e.g. Alkan et al. (1991), Demange and
Gale (1985), Svensson (1983) or Tadenuma and Thomson (1991). Because each fair allocation
distributes the objects eﬃciently, budget-balance (all the available money is allocated among
the agents) is equivalent to eﬃciency under fairness. Now it follows from a famous result
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by Green and Laﬀont (1979) that there is no general budget-balanced and fair allocation
mechanism that is non-manipulable. This conclusion has also been stressed in a number of
recent papers where fair and non-manipulable allocation mechanisms are characterized, see
e.g. Andersson and Svensson (2008), Sun and Yang (2003) and Svensson (2009). Of course,
all these mechanisms violate budget-balance.
However, in many real-life applications, budget-balance is a necessary requirement, and
non-manipulability must be abandoned in order to achieve eﬃciency and fairness.1 This
paper considers such situations and develops a relevant notion that can be used to compare
budget-balanced and fair allocation mechanisms based on their degree of manipulability.
There is a growing literature aiming to compare the ease of manipulation or, equivalently,
the degree of manipulation in mechanisms which are known to be manipulable. Examples
include voting rules, matching mechanisms, school choice mechanisms etc. The early litera-
ture, e.g. Moulin (1980), primarily focuses on restricting the preference domain under which
a mechanism is non-manipulable. In evaluating the degree of manipulability, one direction of
recent research has adopted the idea of counting the number of preference proﬁles at which
a given mechanism is non-manipulable.2 A second direction relies on comparing the sets of
proﬁles on which any two mechanisms are manipulable. According to Pathak and So¨nmez
(2009), a mechanism ϕ is said to be weakly more manipulable than mechanism ψ if (a) for
any proﬁle where ψ is manipulable, also ϕ is manipulable, and (b) there is at least one proﬁle
where ϕ is manipulable although ψ is not.
As we show, none of the above two measures of the degree of manipulability are satis-
factory when comparing budget-balanced and fair allocation rules. This conclusion follows
directly from the observation that if some budget-balanced and fair allocation rule is non-
manipulable at some preference proﬁle, then each budget-balanced and fair allocation rule
is non-manipulable at the very same proﬁle. Thus, all budget-balanced and fair allocation
rules are equally manipulable when counting the number of preference proﬁles at which a
mechanism is non-manipulable, and when comparing the sets of proﬁles where any two mech-
anisms are non-manipulable. To resolve this problem, we introduce a new measure of minimal
manipulability. More explicitly, an allocation rule ϕ is said to be weakly more individually
manipulable than the rule ψ if the number of agents that can manipulate ϕ is weakly greater
than the number of agents that can manipulate ψ at any admissible preference proﬁle. Given
this criterion, we identify the least manipulable budget-balanced and fair allocation rules.
In order to describe the characterized rules, we will need to relate to some previous re-
sults in our environment. Each agent is supposed to have quasi-linear preferences and each
agent should be assigned exactly one object together with some (possibly negative) amount
of money under the restriction that the resulting allocation must be budget-balanced and
fair (envy-free). This type of problem has previously been considered in the literature by
e.g. Haake et al. (2000), Aragones (1995) and Klijn (2000). To ﬁnd a rule that eliminates
proﬁtable deviations through strategic misrepresentation for as many agents (and groups of
agents) as possible, we use the following key observation from the literature on fair and non-
manipulable allocation mechanisms: a necessary and suﬃcient condition for obtaining fair
and non-manipulable outcomes is that for each group of objects with compensations/prices
diﬀerent from the reservation compensations/prices, there is a larger group of agents demand-
1Schummer (2000) shows that non-manipulable and eﬃcient rules must be very “rigid”. See also Miyagawa
(2001).
2See e.g. Aleskerov and Kurbanov (1999), Kelly (1988,1993) and Maus et al. (2007a,b).
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ing objects from that group of objects.3 This observation cannot be directly applied to our
model because there are no reservation compensations/prices. However, the idea to select
compensations to make each object as attractive as possible for as many agents as possible
turns out to be very useful.4 More explicitly, we consider budget-balanced and fair allocation
rules where, given a ﬁxed agent k, the compensations are chosen such that each agent i can
be “linked” through an indiﬀerence chain to agent k. This means that there is a sequence of
agents from i to k such that any agent in this sequence is indiﬀerent between his consumption
bundle and the consumption bundle of the next agent in this sequence. This can be seen
as indirect egalitarian equivalence where any agent is linked through indiﬀerences to agent
k’s consumption bundle. A budget-balanced and fair allocation rule selecting always such
allocations is said to be an agent k-linked fair allocation rule. Any rule choosing for each
preference proﬁle agent k-linked fair allocations, where agent k belongs to an indiﬀerence
component with maximal cardinality, is said to be a maximally linked fair allocation rule.
Here, an indiﬀerence component is simply a maximal set of agents such that any two agents
are linked through an indiﬀerence chain in this set. According to our criterion, the main
result shows that maximally linked fair allocation rules are the minimally manipulable rules
among all budget-balanced and fair allocation rules.
Our main result turns out to be robust with respect to coalitional manipulations. In the
same vein as before, when comparing two mechanisms we count the number of coalitions
that can manipulate at a given proﬁle. Again, maximally linked fair allocation rules are least
coalitionally manipulable among all budget-balanced and fair allocation rules. In particular,
we demonstrate that less than 50% of all coalitions can manipulate the maximal linked fair
allocation rule and provide an exact measure of the maximum number of manipulating agents
and coalitions for a given preference proﬁle. This measure turns out to be very powerful
because it only requires knowledge of the number of agents that are included in an indiﬀerence
component containing agent k. As we show, the set of indiﬀerence components is identical
among all fair allocations for a given preference proﬁle. Since an arbitrary fair allocation
easily can be found by a well-deﬁned polynomially bounded algorithm, as demonstrated by
Klijn (2000), it is not even computationally hard to calculate our measures of individual and
coalitional manipulability (in sharp contrast to the measure where the number of preference
proﬁles at which a given mechanism is manipulable is calculated). Finally, we provide a simple
algorithm for identifying agent k-linked and maximally linked fair allocations for quasi-linear
utilities, and demonstrate that this algorithm converges in a ﬁnite number of iterations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 states our model of assignment with com-
pensations and budget-balanced and fair allocation rules. Section 3 deﬁnes agent k-linked
fair allocations and maximally linked fair allocation rules, and provides some basic results.
Section 4 shows that previous measures of manipulability do not distinguish among budget-
balanced and fair allocation rules. It introduces our new criterion of minimal manipulability
and contains our main result showing that maximally linked fair allocation rules are mini-
mally manipulable among all budget-balanced and fair allocation rules. Section 5 identiﬁes
both the set of agents and coalitions that can manipulate agent k-linked fair allocation rules.
It provides another characterization of maximally linked fair allocation rules using minimal
coalitional manipulability. Finally, Section 6 provides an algorithm for identifying agent k-
3See in particular Andersson and Svensson (2008, Lemma 4) and Mishra and Talman (2010, Theorem 2).
4Similar ideas have previously been used by e.g. Dubey (1982) and Svensson (1991) where the “tightness”
of the market is demonstrated to have a signiﬁcant impact on the manipulation possibilities.
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linked fair and budget-balanced allocations and maximally linked fair allocations. Some proofs
are omitted in the main text and are given in the Appendix.
2 Assignment with Compensations
2.1 Agents, Allocations, and Preferences
Let N = {1, ..., n} and M = {1, ...,m} denote the set of agents and objects, respectively. The
number of agents and objects are assumed to coincide, i.e., |N | = |M |.5 Each agent consumes
exactly one object together with some amount of money. A consumption bundle is a pair
(j, α) ∈ M ×R where α is the monetary compensation received when consuming object j. An
allocation (a, x) is a list of n consumption bundles where a : N → M is a mapping assigning
object ai to agent i ∈ N , and where x ∈ RM (or x : M → R) assigns the amount xj of money
for the object j ∈ M . An allocation (a, x) is feasible if ai = aj whenever i = j for i, j ∈ N ,
and
∑
j∈M xj ≤ 0.6 If
∑
j∈M xj = 0, then the allocation (a, x) satisﬁes budget-balance. Let
A denote the set of feasible and budget-balanced allocations.
Each agent i ∈ N has preferences over consumption bundles (j, xj) which are represented
by continuous utility functions ui : M × RM → R. We will write uij(x) instead of ui(j, x) to
denote the utility of agent i when consuming object j and receiving compensation xj in the
distribution vector x. The utility function is assumed to be quasi-linear and strictly increasing
in money, i.e.,
uij(x) = vij + xj for some vij ∈ R.
A list of utility functions u = (ui)i∈N is a (preference) proﬁle. We also adopt the notational
convention of writing u = (uC , u−C) for C ⊆ N . The set of proﬁles with utility functions
having the above properties is denoted by U .
Let u ∈ U and (a, x) be a feasible allocation. Then (a, x) is eﬃcient if there exists no
feasible allocation (b, y) such that uibi(y) ≥ uiai(x) for all i ∈ N with strict inequality holding
for some j ∈ N . Obviously, if (a, x) is eﬃcient, then (a, x) is budget-balanced.
Throughout the paper we focus on feasible allocations satisfying budget-balance.7 For con-
venience, in the following allocation stands for “feasible allocation satisfying budget-balance”.
2.2 Fair Allocation Rules
The fundamental concept of fairness corresponds to envy-freeness which was ﬁrst introduced
by Foley (1967). It says that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other
agent’s bundle.
Definition 1. For a given proﬁle u ∈ U , an allocation (a, x) is fair if uiai(x) ≥ uiaj (x) for all
i, j ∈ N . Let F (u) denote the set of fair allocations for a given proﬁle u ∈ U .
It is well-known that under fairness, for feasible allocations eﬃciency is equivalent to
budget-balance.8
5If |N | < |M |, then we simply add |N | − |M | null objects with zero value for all agents.
6All our results remain true if the budget constraint is replaced by
∑
j∈M xj ≤ x0 for an arbitrary x0 ∈ R.
7When budget-balance is relaxed to
∑
j∈M xj ≤ 0, then general non-manipulability results are possible, see
e.g. Andersson and Svensson (2008) or Sun and Yang (2004).
8This is due to the fact that any fair allocation must assign the objects eﬃciently.
4
The following is a well-known property of fair allocations (see e.g. Svensson, 2009): if
two allocations are fair at a given proﬁle, then one may interchange both the assignment of
objects and the monetary distribution without losing fairness. Obviously, this result holds for
fair allocations satisfying budget-balance.
Lemma 1. Suppose that allocations (a, x) and (b, y) are fair at proﬁle u ∈ U . Then allocations
(a, y) and (b, x) are also fair at proﬁle u ∈ U .
An allocation rule is a non-empty correspondence ϕ choosing for each proﬁle u ∈ U a set
of allocations, ϕ(u) ⊆ A, such that uibi(y) = uiai(x) for all i ∈ N and all (a, x), (b, y) ∈ ϕ(u).
Hence, the various allocations in the set ϕ(u) are utility equivalent. Such a correspondence
is called essentially single-valued. It is important to note that alternatively we may consider
single-valued allocation rules choosing for each proﬁle u ∈ U a unique allocation. All our
results remain unchanged for single-valued allocation rules.
An allocation rule ϕ is called fair if for any proﬁle u ∈ U , ϕ(u) ⊆ F (u). The following is
a useful property of fair allocation rules.
Lemma 2. Let ϕ be a fair allocation rule and u ∈ U . If (a, x), (b, y) ∈ ϕ(u), then x = y.
Proof. Since (a, x), (b, y) ∈ ϕ(u), we have uiai(x) = uibi(y) for all i ∈ N . By fairness,
uiai(x) ≥ uibi(x). Thus, uibi(y) ≥ uibi(x) and ybi ≥ xbi . Similarly, we obtain xbi ≥ ybi . Hence,
x = y, the desired conclusion.
An important implication of Lemma 2 is that for fair allocation rules, the same distribution
of money is chosen for any given preference proﬁle. Hence, often for the study of fair allocation
rules it is suﬃcient to consider its induced distributions of money.
3 Maximally Linked Fair Allocations
In the coming analysis, indiﬀerence chains and indiﬀerence components will be of primary
importance for allocations. These two concepts are introduced next.
Definition 2. Let (a, x) ∈ A.
(i) For any i, j ∈ N , we write i →(a,x) j if:
uiai(x) = uiaj (x).
(ii) An indiﬀerence chain at allocation (a, x) consists of a tuple of distinct agents g =
(i0, ..., ik) such that i0 →(a,x) i1 →(a,x) · · · →(a,x) ik.
(iii) An indiﬀerence component at allocation (a, x) is a non-empty set G ⊆ N such that for
all i, k ∈ G there exists an indiﬀerence chain at (a, x) in G, say g = (i0, ..., ik) with
{i0, . . . , ik} ⊆ G, such that i = i0 and ik = k, and there exists no G′  G satisfying the
previous property at allocation (a, x).
Note that i →(a,x) j means that agent i is indiﬀerent between his consumption bundle
and agent j’s consumption bundle, and agent i is directly linked via indiﬀerence to agent j at
allocation (a, x). An indiﬀerence chain at an allocation is simply a sequence of agents such
that any agent in the sequence is indiﬀerent between his bundle and the bundle of the agent
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following him in the sequence. Indiﬀerence chains indirectly link agents via indiﬀerence in a
sequence of directly linked agents. In an indiﬀerence component, any two agents are linked
through an indiﬀerence chain in this component and there is no superset of this component
where any two agents are linked through an indiﬀerence chain.
The next result states an important property of indiﬀerence components, namely that
if there are two allocations that are budget-balanced and fair at some proﬁle u ∈ U and if
there is an indiﬀerence component at one of these allocations, then the very same indiﬀerence
component must be present at the other allocation.
Lemma 3. Suppose that allocations (a, x) and (b, y) are budget-balanced and fair at proﬁle
u ∈ U , and that there is an indiﬀerence component G at allocation (a, x). Then the same
indiﬀerence component G is present at allocation (b, y).
Proof. By Lemma 1, we know that (a, y) is fair. First we show that the indiﬀerence component
G is present at (a, y).
Because G is an indiﬀerence component at (a, x), G consists of indiﬀerence chains g =
(i0, i1, . . . , ik) such that ik →(a,x) i0. Thus, we have i0 →(a,x) i1 →(a,x) · · · →(a,x) ik →(a,x) i0.
We show i0 →(a,y) i1 →(a,y) · · · →(a,y) ik →(a,y) i0.
For any i ∈ N , let Δai = yai−xai . To obtain a contradiction, suppose that we do not have
i0 →(a,y) i1 →(a,y) · · · →(a,y) ik →(a,y) i0, say ui0ai0 (x) = ui0ai1 (x) but ui0ai0 (y) > ui0ai1 (y).
Thus, Δai0 > Δai1 . Now, fairness is respected among the agents in G at allocation (a, y) only
if:
Δaij ≥ Δaij+1 for all j ∈ {0, ..., k − 1}, (1)
Δaik ≥ Δai0 . (2)
From (1) and Δai0 > Δai1 , we obtain Δai0 > Δaik . Hence, (2) is not satisﬁed. Thus, allocation
(a, y) cannot be fair, which contradicts our assumption. Hence, i0 →(a,y) i1 →(a,y) · · · →(a,y)
ik →(a,y) i0. Note that there exists no G′  G such that G′ is an indiﬀerence component at
(a, y) because otherwise, using the previous arguments, any two agents in G′ are connected
through some indiﬀerence chain at (a, x) in G′ which contradicts the deﬁnition of G being an
indiﬀerence component at (a, x). Thus, the indiﬀerence component G is present at (a, y).
Next, we show that G must be also an indiﬀerence component at (b, y). Fairness implies
that:
uiai(y) = uibi(y) for all i ∈ N. (3)
Let j, k ∈ G and suppose that j →(a,y) k. Let ak = bk and l1 ∈ N be such that al1 = bk.
Obviously, (3) implies k →(a,y) l1. More generally, let l1, . . . , lt be such that alr = blr−1 with
r = 2, . . . , t and ak = blt . Note that such a “cycle” exists because |N | = |M |. Now obviously
we have k →(a,y) l1, lr →(a,y) lr+1 for all r = 1, . . . , t− 1, and lt →(a,y) k. Since k ∈ G and G
is an indiﬀerence component at (a, y), we must have {l1, . . . , lt} ⊆ G.
Now by (3), we have ujbj (y) = ujaj (y) = ujak(y) = ujblt (y) which implies j →(b,y) lt. Note
that by construction, we also have l1 →(b,y) k and lr →(b,y) lr−1 for all r = 2, . . . , t. This
means that j and k are connected through the indiﬀerence chain j →(b,y) lt →(b,y) lt−1 →(b,y)
· · · →(b,y) l1 →(b,y) k in G under (b, y). Because this is true for any j, k ∈ G such that
j →(a,y) k, it also follows that any two agents belonging to G must be connected through an
indiﬀerence chain in G at (b, y). Furthermore, there can be no G′  G satisfying this property
under (b, y) because by the same argument G′ would also satisfy this property under (a, x),
which would contradict the deﬁnition of an indiﬀerence component.
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Lemma 3 has the important implication that the same indiﬀerence components are present
at all budget-balanced and fair allocations (for a given proﬁle). In other words, indiﬀerence
components at fair allocations only depend on the preference proﬁle u because they are in-
variant with respect to the selected fair allocation.
Given the deﬁnition of indiﬀerence components, we next introduce the concept of linked
agents. We are especially interested in so-called agent k-linked allocations. At such an
allocation, each agent is linked to agent k through some indiﬀerence chain.
Definition 3. Let (a, x) ∈ A.
(i) Agent i ∈ N is linked to agent k ∈ N at allocation (a, x) if there exists an indiﬀerence
chain of type (i0, ..., it) at allocation (a, x) with i = i0 and it = k.
(ii) The allocation (a, x) is agent k-linked if each agent i ∈ N is linked to agent k.
In the following fair allocations which are agent k-linked (with k ∈ N) will play an
important role.
Remark 1. Agent k-linked fair allocations (a, x) can be viewed as (ak, xak)-linked fair allo-
cations. In the same vein, any agent i is linked through an indiﬀerence chain to the consump-
tion bundle (ak, xak) under allocation (a, x). One may interpret this as “indirect” egalitarian
equivalence where each agent is connected through some indiﬀerence chain to the consump-
tion bundle (ak, xak). Recall that in “direct” egalitarian equivalence each agent views his
consumption bundle as utility equivalent to (ak, xak).
The next result states that if there are two (or more) agent k-linked fair allocations at
a speciﬁc proﬁle u ∈ U , then the monetary distribution of both of these allocations must
coincide. This is the analogue of Lemma 2 for agent k-linked fair allocations.
Lemma 4. If the budget-balanced and fair allocations (a, x) and (b, y) are agent k-linked at
proﬁle u ∈ U , then x = y.
Proof. By Lemma 1, we know that (a, y) is also fair. First, we show that (a, y) is agent
k-linked if (b, y) is agent k-linked. Fairness implies:
uiai(y) = uibi(y) for all i ∈ N. (4)
Let ak = bk and j ∈ N be such that aj = bk. Obviously, (4) implies j →(a,y) k. Now suppose
that i →(b,y) k and i = j. But now by (4), we have uiai(y) = uibi(y) = uibk(y) = uiaj (y) which
implies i →(a,y) j →(a,y) k and agent i is linked to agent k through some indiﬀerence chain.
Using these arguments, it is now easy to verify that (a, y) is agent k-linked (if either ak = bk
or ak = bk). Thus, without loss of generality we may assume a = b.
Suppose that the fair allocations (a, x) and (a, y) are agent k-linked but x = y. Then by
budget-balance and x = y, there must be two non-empty groups of agents:
A = {i ∈ N | xai > yai},
B = {i ∈ N | xai ≤ yai}.
Note that for all i ∈ A and all j ∈ B, uiai(x) > uiai(y) ≥ uiaj (y) ≥ uiaj (x). Hence, no agent
in A can be linked to any agent in B at allocation (a, x). Because (a, x) is agent k-linked, we
must have k ∈ A. Let j ∈ B and i ∈ A. By fairness and monotonicity:
ujaj (y) ≥ ujaj (x) ≥ ujai(x) > ujai(y).
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Thus, at allocation (a, y) no agent in B can be linked to any agent in A. Hence, by k ∈ A,
allocation (a, y) cannot be agent k-linked which contradicts our assumption.
Given k ∈ N , let ψk(u) ⊆ F (u) denote the set of all budget-balanced and fair allocations
which are agent k-linked at proﬁle u ∈ U . Section 6 establishes the non-emptiness of this set
by providing an algorithm to compute such allocations.
Proposition 1. ψk is an allocation rule, i.e. for any u ∈ U , all allocations (a, x), (b, y) ∈ ψk(u)
are utility equivalent.
Proof. Let (a, x), (b, y) ∈ ψk(u) and i ∈ N . By Lemma 4, we have x = y. Obviously, if ai = bi,
then uiai(x) = uibi(y). If ai = bi, then by fairness both uiai(x) ≥ uibi(x) and uiai(y) ≤ uibi(y).
Hence, by x = y, uiai(x) = uibi(y), the desired conclusion.
We call ψk the agent k-linked fair allocation rule. As will become clear in the following
section, agent k-linked fair allocation rules have a number of good strategic properties. How-
ever, depending on the reported proﬁle u ∈ U and the selection of k ∈ N , the manipulability
possibilities will diﬀer. Thus, when deﬁning the allocation rule, it is important to select the
right k ∈ N for a given proﬁle u. For this reason, the selection of agent k will be endogenously
determined by the reported proﬁle u ∈ U as explained below.
For a given report u ∈ U , recall that the set of indiﬀerence components is identical for all
allocations in F (u) by Lemma 3. Let
G(u) = {G ⊆ N | G is an indiﬀerence component at all (a, x) ∈ F (u)}.
denote the set of all indiﬀerence components of fair allocations for proﬁle u. Note also that
for any i ∈ N , there exists G ∈ G(u) such that i ∈ G (where G = {i} is possible). Let
G¯(u) = {G ∈ G(u) | |G| ≥ |G′| for all G′ ∈ G(u)},
denote the set of indiﬀerence components with maximal cardinality, and let:
G¯(u) = ∪G∈G¯(u)G,
denote the union of all indiﬀerence components with maximal cardinality.
The idea of the following rules is ﬁrst to select an indiﬀerence component with maximal
cardinality, second some agent k belonging to this indiﬀerence component and third the set
of agent k-linked fair allocations.
A maximal selection is a function κ : U → N such that for all u ∈ U we have κ(u) ∈ G¯(u).
The maximally linked fair allocation rule ψκ based on κ is deﬁned as follows: for all u ∈ U ,
let ψκ(u) = ψκ(u)(u). Note that by Proposition 1, ψκ is a well-deﬁned allocation rule because
ψk(u) is essentially single-valued for any k ∈ N and any u ∈ U . Furthermore, we will say
that an allocation rule ϕ is a maximally linked fair allocation rule if there exists a maximal
selection κ such that for all u ∈ U we have ϕ(u) ⊆ ψκ(u).
The function κ is a systematic selection from G¯(u). The meaning of “systematic selection”
is that there is a well deﬁned rule for selecting k. This rule can be arbitrary and all our
results hold independently of this rule. For example, the rule could be based on a randomized
selection from G¯(u) or simply the k with the lowest or highest index in G¯(u).
Our main result will compare maximally linked fair allocation rules with arbitrary budget-
balanced and fair allocation rules.
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4 Minimal Manipulability
In the following we will determine the (non-)manipulation possibilities of budget-balanced
and fair allocation rules.
Definition 4. An allocation rule ϕ is manipulable at a proﬁle u ∈ U by an agent i ∈ N if
there exists a proﬁle (uˆi, u−i) ∈ U and two allocations (a, x) ∈ ϕ(u) and (b, y) ∈ ϕ(uˆi, u−i)
such that uibi(y) > uiai(x). If the allocation rule ϕ is not manipulable by any agent at proﬁle
u ∈ U , then ϕ is said to be non-manipulable at proﬁle u.
Remark 2. Since allocation rules may choose sets of allocations, one may alternatively
employ a more conservative notion of manipulability: ϕ is strongly manipulable at a proﬁle
u ∈ U by an agent i ∈ N if there exists a proﬁle (uˆi, u−i) ∈ U such that uibi(y) > uiai(x) for
all (a, x) ∈ ϕ(u) and all (b, y) ∈ ϕ(uˆi, u−i). From Svensson (2009, Proposition 3 and its proof)
it follows that for any fair allocation rule ϕ and any proﬁle u ∈ U , ϕ is strongly manipulable
at proﬁle u by i if and only if ϕ is manipulable at proﬁle u by i. Hence, instead we may use
the conservative notion of manipulability instead of ours.
It is well-known (Green and Laﬀont, 1979) that any budget-balanced and fair rule is
manipulable for some proﬁle u ∈ U . Thus, we need a measure of the degree of manipulability
in order to compare two diﬀerent budget-balanced and fair allocation rules. As it will turn
out, previous notions of degrees of manipulability will not distinguish budget-balanced and
fair allocation rules.
We show that for any fair allocation rule and any proﬁle u, the fair allocation rule cannot
be manipulated by any agent at proﬁle u if and only if a maximally linked fair allocation rule
cannot be manipulated by any agent at proﬁle u.
Proposition 2. Let ϕ be a budget-balanced and fair allocation rule, ψκ be a maximally
linked fair allocation rule and u ∈ U . Then the maximally linked allocation rule ψκ is non-
manipulable at proﬁle u if and only if the fair allocation rule ϕ is non-manipulable at proﬁle
u.
We will defer the proof to the next section where we identify agents who can manipulate
maximally linked fair allocation rules.
Remark 3 (Counting Profiles). Several authors (see e.g. Maus et al., 2007a, 2007b) have
proposed to compare two rules via counting the number of proﬁles where some agent can
manipulate the rule. Obviously, Proposition 2 shows for any proﬁle u, that either all fair rules
are manipulable or all fair rules cannot be manipulated at the given proﬁle by any agent.
Remark 4 (Comparing Sets of Profiles). Pathak and So¨nmez (2009) propose to compare
two rules via comparing the sets of proﬁles where some agent can manipulate a rule. They
call a rule ϕ weakly more manipulable than a rule ϕ′, if for any problem where some agent
i manipulates ϕ′, there exists an agent j who manipulates ϕ at this problem. Again Propo-
sition 2 shows that all fair allocation rules are equally manipulable regarding this degree of
manipulability.
Given these observations, a “ﬁrst-order approach” by considering proﬁles where no agent
can manipulate the rule does not reﬁne the set of fair allocation rules. Here we will propose
a “second-order approach” by comparing the cardinalities of the sets of agents who can ma-
nipulate a fair allocation rule at a given proﬁle. For this purpose, let Pϕ(u) denote the set of
agents who can manipulate the allocation rule ϕ at proﬁle u ∈ U .
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Definition 5. An allocation rule ϕ˜ is weakly more (individually) manipulable than the allo-
cation rule ϕ if |P ϕ˜(u)| ≥ |Pϕ(u)| for all u ∈ U .
Our main result establishes that maximally linked fair allocation rules are minimally
manipulable among all budget-balanced and fair allocation rules. The proof is delegated to
the Appendix.
Theorem 1. Let ϕ be a budget-balanced and fair allocation rule and let ψκ be a maximally
linked fair allocation rule. Then ϕ is weakly more manipulable than ψκ.
In other words, maximally linked fair allocation rules are least manipulable in the class of
budget-balanced and fair allocation rules. One can also see that when a fair rule is not a max-
imally linked fair allocation rule, then there exists some proﬁle where this rule is manipulable
by more agents than a maximally linked fair allocation rule. Therefore, maximally linked fair
allocation rules are characterized by minimal manipulability among all budget-balanced and
fair allocation rules.
The proofs of our result will also reveal the following corollary.
Corollary 1. (i) ψk cannot be manipulated by agent k at any proﬁle u ∈ U .
(ii) For any two distinct agents i, j ∈ N , there exists no budget-balanced and fair allocation
rule ϕ such that neither i nor j can manipulate ϕ at any proﬁle u ∈ U .
Note that Corollary 1 has the same ﬂavor as the corresponding results in two-sided match-
ing (with men and women): (i) for any agent there exists a stable matching rule which is not
manipulable by this agent at any proﬁle; and (ii) there is no stable matching rule which cannot
be manipulated by at least one man and at least one woman (Ma, 1995).
5 Identifying Non-Manipulating Agents and Coalitions
We will identify both the agents and coalitions who are able to proﬁtably manipulate an agent
k-linked fair allocation rule. This will allow us to determine at which proﬁles such a rule is
non-manipulable and to compare budget-balanced and fair allocation rules regarding their
possibilities of coalitional manipulations.
We adopt the following version of coalition manipulability and non-manipulability.
Definition 6. An allocation rule ϕ is manipulable at a proﬁle u ∈ U by a coalition C ⊆ N
if there is a proﬁle (uˆC , u−C) ∈ U and two allocations (a, x) ∈ ϕ(u) and (b, y) ∈ ϕ(uˆC , u−C)
such that uibi(y) > uiai(x) for all i ∈ C. If the allocation rule ϕ is not manipulable by any
coalition at proﬁle u, then ϕ is said to be coalitionally non-manipulable at proﬁle u.
In the same vein as Remark 2, we may use a more conservative notion of coalitional
manipulability where all deviating agents are strictly better oﬀ after the deviation for any of
the chosen allocations. Again by Svensson (2009, Proposition 3 and its proof), this would not
change any of our results below.
Our next result shows that the agent k-linked fair allocation rule cannot be manipulated
by any coalition containing agent k. The intuition behind this is as follows. If agent k
successfully can manipulate the allocation rule, then by fairness agent k must be assigned a
consumption bundle where the monetary compensation increases. Then because each agent
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is linked to agent k, each agent must be assigned a consumption bundle where the monetary
compensation increases, because if this not is the case then fairness is violated at the new
allocation. But then the budget must be exceeded. Hence, agent k cannot manipulate.
The same intuition even holds for any fair allocation rule choosing only agent k-linked fair
allocations for some proﬁle.
Lemma 5. Let ϕ be a budget-balanced and fair allocation rule, k ∈ N and u ∈ U . If
ϕ(u) ⊆ ψk(u), then no coalition C ⊆ N containing agent k can manipulate ϕ at proﬁle u.
Proof. Let C ⊆ N be such that k ∈ C. Suppose that ϕ is manipulable at proﬁle u by
coalition C. Then there is a proﬁle (uˆC , u−C) ∈ U and two allocations (a, x) ∈ ϕ(u) and
(b, y) ∈ ϕ(uˆC , u−C) such that uibi(y) > uiai(x) for all i ∈ C. Note that ϕ(u) ⊆ ψk(u) and
(a, x) ∈ ψk(u).
By fairness, uiai(x) ≥ uibi(x) for all i ∈ C. Hence, for all i ∈ C, uibi(y) > uibi(x) and
ybi > xbi . Because (b, y) satisﬁes budget-balance, we must have C  N . Since k ∈ C and
(a, x) is an agent k-linked fair allocation, there exists i ∈ N−C and j ∈ C such that i →(a,x) j.
Now by yaj > xaj (j ∈ C) and uiai(x) = uiaj (x), fairness and monotonicity imply:
uibi(y) ≥ uiaj (y) > uiaj (x) = uiai(x) ≥ uibi(x).
Hence, ybi > xbi . Let C
1 = C ∪ {i ∈ N | i →(a,x) j for some j ∈ C}. Thus, we have ybi > xbi
for all i ∈ C1.
Using the same arguments it follows that for each i ∈ N such that i →(a,x) j for some
j ∈ C1, we have ybi > xbi . For any l, let C l+1 = C l ∪ {i ∈ N | i →(a,x) j for some j ∈ C l}.
Because (a, x) is agent k-linked, for some t we obtain Ct = N and ybi > xbi for all i ∈ Ct,
which is contradiction to budget-balance of (b, y). Hence, C cannot manipulate ϕ at proﬁle
u.
Remark 5. Lemma 5 implies that the agent k-linked fair allocation rule cannot be manip-
ulated by any coalition containing k at any proﬁle. In particular, the agent k-linked fair
allocation rule is not manipulable by agent k at any proﬁle u, which is the ﬁrst part of
Corollary 1. The second part of Corollary 1 is easy to verify and left to the reader.
The following proposition identiﬁes all preference proﬁles u ∈ U at which an agent k-linked
fair allocation rule is (coalitionally) non-manipulable.
Proposition 3. Let k ∈ N and u ∈ U . Then ψk is (coalitionally) non-manipulable at proﬁle
u if and only if G(u) = {N}, i.e. if and only if N is the unique indiﬀerence component at
proﬁle u.
Proof. We only prove the “if” part of because the “only if” part follows directly from Lemma
7 in the Appendix. Since G(u) = {N}, any (a, x) ∈ F (u) is agent i-linked for any i ∈ N .
Since ψk(u) ⊆ F (u), Lemma 5 implies that no coalition containing i can manipulate ψk at
proﬁle u. Hence, ψk is both (individually) non-manipulable at proﬁle u and coalitionally
non-manipulable at proﬁle u, the desired conclusion.
Now Proposition 3 allows us to demonstrate that an arbitrary fair allocation rule is non-
manipulable at a proﬁle if and only if the agent k-linked fair allocation rule is non-manipulable
at this proﬁle. Using Lemma 5, this result implies Proposition 2 (which was used in Section
4 to motivate our “second-order approach” to minimal manipulability).
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Proposition 4. Let ϕ be a budget-balanced and fair allocation rule, k ∈ N and u ∈ U .
Then ψk is (coalitionally) non-manipulable at proﬁle u if and only if ϕ is (coalitionally)
non-manipulable at proﬁle u.
Proof. For the “only if” part, suppose that ψk is not (coalitionally) manipulable at proﬁle u.
By Proposition 3, G(u) = {N} and any (a, x) ∈ F (u) is agent i-linked for all i ∈ N . Since
ϕ(u) ⊆ F (u), now any (a, x) ∈ ϕ(u) is agent i-linked for all i ∈ N . Thus, ϕ(u) ⊆ ψi(u) for
all i ∈ N . By Lemma 5, no coalition containing i can manipulate ϕ at proﬁle u. Hence, ϕ is
(coalitionally) non-manipulable at proﬁle u, the desired conclusion.
For the “if” part, suppose that ϕ is (coalitionally or individually) non-manipulable at
proﬁle u but some ψk is manipulable by an agent or a coalition at proﬁle u. By Proposition
3, G(u) = {N}. But now Lemma 7 in the Appendix shows ϕ is manipulable at proﬁle u, a
contradiction.
Lemma 5 showed that an agent k-linked fair allocation rule cannot be manipulated by any
coalition containing agent k at any given proﬁle. Below we extend this result and determine
for any proﬁle the precise number of coalitions who can manipulate the agent k-linked fair
allocation rule. Speciﬁcally, we demonstrate that ψk can be manipulated by less than 50% of
all coalitions at any proﬁle.
Corollary 2. Let k ∈ N .
(i) Let u ∈ U and S ∈ G(u) be such that k ∈ S. Then ψk can be manipulated at proﬁle u
by exactly 2|N |−|S| − 1 coalitions.
(ii) For any proﬁle u ∈ U , ψk can be manipulated at proﬁle u by at most 2|N |−1−1 coalitions.
As a consequence, ψk can be manipulated at any proﬁle u ∈ U by less than 50% of all
coalitions.
Proof. To prove (i), note that for all i ∈ S and all (a, x) ∈ ψk(u), allocation (a, x) is agent
i-linked. Thus, ψk(u) ⊆ ψi(u) and by Lemma 5, no coalition containing i can manipulate
ψk at proﬁle u. Thus, at most 2|N |−|S| − 1 coalitions can manipulate ψk at proﬁle u. From
Lemma 7 in the Appendix, it follows that this bound is tight, i.e. that exactly 2|N |−|S| − 1
coalitions can manipulate ψk at proﬁle u.
To prove (ii), note that |S| ≥ 1. Because 2|N |−|S| < 2|N |−1 for any |S| > 1, it follows
from Part (i) of this corollary that ψk can be manipulated at proﬁle u by at most 2|N |−1 − 1
coalitions. Since there are 2|N |−1 non-empty coalitions of N and 2|N |−1 = 2(2|N |−1−1)+1,
less than 50% of all coalitions can manipulate ψk at proﬁle u.
Note that Corollary 2 used the fact that for any indiﬀerence component, for agent k
belonging to this component, the agent k-linked fair allocation rule is not manipulable by
any coalition containing some agent in this indiﬀerence component. Now in order to calculate
the number of manipulating coalitions, at a given proﬁle, one only need to know the number
of agents that are included in an indiﬀerence component containing agent k. Then since
indiﬀerence components are invariant with respect to the chosen fair allocation, the algorithm
in Klijn (2000) can be used to ﬁnd the exact number of manipulating coalitions at a given
proﬁle for any agent k-linked fair allocation rule. Because the algorithm in Klijn (2000) is
polynomially bounded, it is not even computationally hard to calculate this measure.
To investigate the degree of coalition manipulability, let Qϕ(u) denote the coalitions C ⊆
N that can manipulate the allocation rule ϕ at proﬁle u ∈ U .
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Definition 7. An allocation rule ϕ˜ is weakly more coalitionally manipulable than the allo-
cation rule ϕ if |Qϕ˜(u)| ≥ |Qϕ(u)| for all u ∈ U .
The following result states that maximally linked fair allocation rules are least coalition-
ally manipulable among all budget-balanced and fair allocation rules. This can be seen as
an extension of Theorem 1 from minimal individual manipulability to minimal coalitional
manipulability and Theorem 1 is robust with respect to coalitional manipulations. The proof
can be found in the Appendix.
Theorem 2. Let ϕ be a budget-balanced and fair allocation rule and ψκ be a maximally
linked fair allocation rule. Then ϕ is weakly more coalitionally manipulable than ψκ.
Again one can see that when a fair rule is not a maximally linked fair allocation rule, then
there exists some proﬁle where this rule is manipulable by more coalitions than a maximally
linked fair allocation rule.
6 The Algorithm
Given the results concerning manipulability from the previous section, it is important to
ﬁnd an algorithm for identifying agent k-linked fair allocations. Once such allocations are
identiﬁed, it is also possible to identify G(u), and as a consequence, maximally linked fair
allocations. We provide an algorithm that achieves this task. In similarity with Aragones
(1995), our algorithm cannot start at an arbitrary feasible allocation. Instead, we suppose
that an arbitrary budget-balanced and fair allocation is known for the given proﬁle. This
assumption is not restrictive since arbitrary such allocations can be identiﬁed in polynomial
time as demonstrated by Klijn (2000).9
Given that a budget-balanced and fair allocation (a, x) is known for a given proﬁle u ∈ U ,
Lemma 3 can be used to ﬁnd the set G(u). More explicitly, if allocation (a, x) is known,
all indiﬀerence components that are present at this allocation will also be present at each
allocation that is budget-balanced and fair for the same proﬁle by Lemma 3. It is therefore
an easy task to identify the components containing the most agents. The following example
demonstrates the principle, and it will be used throughout this section to illustrate the main
ideas and concepts.
Example 1. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and M = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Let the values of the objects for
the agents in the proﬁle u be given by the matrix:
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
v11 v12 v13 v14 v15
v21 v22 v23 v24 v25
v31 v32 v33 v34 v35
v41 v42 v43 v44 v45
v51 v52 v53 v54 v55
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 2 2 0
0 0 0 0 3
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(5)
For these valuations it is clear that e.g. the allocation (a, x) where ai = i and xai = 0 for all
i ∈ N is budget-balanced and fair. There are two indiﬀerence chains present at this allocation,
9See Haake et al. (2000) for a similar procedure. Note also that there are a number of algorithms for
identifying so-called fair and optimal allocations, see e.g. Andersson and Andersson (2009) or Shioura et al.
(2006). Also these algorithms can be used to identify budget-balanced and fair allocations by adding a simple
rule for sharing the deﬁcit (or the surplus) equally among the agents.
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namely 2 →(a,x) 1 and 4 →(a,x) 3. Any indiﬀerence component consists of a single agent, and
we have G(u) = {{i} | i ∈ N}.10 Consequently, G¯(u) = N . 
In the main algorithm so-called isolated groups will be crucial. This notion is deﬁned
below.
Definition 8. A coalition of agents H ⊆ N is said to be isolated at allocation (a, x) if
i →(a,x) j for all i ∈ N −H and all j ∈ H.
In other words, a coalition is isolated at allocation (a, x) if no agent outside of H is
indiﬀerent between his consumption bundle and the bundle received by any agent in H.
Before we provide the main algorithm, we ﬁrst state a simple algorithm that always
identiﬁes an isolated group H at allocation (a, x) containing agent k.
Algorithm 1 (Isolated Groups). Let allocation (a, x) be an arbitrary budget-balanced and
fair allocation at proﬁle u ∈ U and let k ∈ N . Introduce an iteration counter t and set t = 0.
Let K0 = {k}. For each iteration t = 1, 2, . . . :
Step t. Deﬁne Kt = Kt−1 ∪ {i ∈ N −Kt−1 | i →(a,x) j for some j ∈ Kt−1}. If Kt = Kt−1,
then stop. Otherwise continue to Step t + 1.
Obviously, if Kt = N for some t, then (a, x) is agent k-linked and Algorithm 1 veriﬁes
whether a given allocation is agent k-linked.
Lemma 6. For each u ∈ U and each K0 = {k}, Algorithm 1 identiﬁes a (possibly empty)
isolated group that contains agent k in at most |N | iterations.
Proof. Assume that the algorithm terminates at Step t. If Kt = N , then uiai(x) > uiaj (x)
(or i →(a,x) j) for all i ∈ N −Kt and all j ∈ Kt by construction of the algorithm. Thus, Kt
is isolated by Deﬁnition 8. Note that k ∈ Kt since {k} = K0 ⊆ Kt.
Finally, let T be the last step of the algorithm, and note that because |Kt| − |Kt−1| ≥ 1
as long as 1 ≤ t < T , it is clear that the algorithm terminates in at most |N | number of
iterations.
We next illustrate Algorithm 1 using Example 1.
Example 2 (Example 1 continued). Start with K0 = {1}. Then Algorithm 1 terminates in
two steps, i.e.:
Step 1. From (5), it is clear that i →(a,x) 1 only for i = 2. Hence, K1 = {1} ∪ {2} = {1, 2}.
Step 2. From (5), it is clear that i →(a,x) j for all i ∈ N−K1 and all j ∈ K1. Hence, K2 = K1
and Algorithm 1 terminates. 
Both the distribution and the assignment are ﬁxed in Algorithm 1. Note that in the proof
of Lemma 4 we showed that for any agent k-linked fair allocation (b, y) and any fair allocation
(a, x), allocation (a, y) is also agent k-linked and fair. Thus, without loss of generality, in the
algorithm below the assignment of objects remains unchanged. We next provide an algorithm
for identifying an agent k-linked fair allocation given that the distribution is allowed to change.
10If e.g. v12 = 1 then there is one indiﬀerence component containing agents 1 and 2.
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Algorithm 2 (Agent k-linked Fair Allocation). Let allocation (a, x) be budget-balanced
and fair. Introduce an iteration counter t and let xt denote the distribution in iteration t. Set
t = 0 and initialize the distribution at x0 = x. Let K0 = {k}. For each iteration t = 1, 2, . . . :
Step t. For the given allocation (a, xt−1) run Algorithm 1 and let N t be the set identiﬁed in the
last step of Algorithm 1. If N−N t = ∅, then stop. Otherwise, let λtij = uiai(xt−1)−uiaj (xt−1)
for each i ∈ N −N t and each j ∈ N t. Deﬁne λt = mini∈N−Nt,j∈Nt λtij . Let the distribution
xt be given by:
xtai = x
t−1
ai −
|N t|
|N | · λ
t for each i ∈ N −N t,
xtaj = x
t−1
aj +
|N −N t|
|N | · λ
t for each j ∈ N t,
and continue to Step t + 1. 
The following is our main convergence result. The proof is delegated to the Appendix.
Theorem 3. For each u ∈ U , Algorithm 2 identiﬁes an agent k-linked fair allocation in at
most |N | number of iterations.
We use our example to illustrate the procedure described in Algorithm 2.
Example 3 (Example 1 continued). Recall that K0 = {1}, ai = i and x0ai = 0 for all i ∈ N .
Step 1. From Example 2 we know that N1 = {1, 2} (and N −N1 = {3, 4, 5}). From matrix
(5), it is also easy to see that λ13j = 1, λ
1
4j = 2 and λ
1
5j = 3 for all j ∈ N1. Thus, λ1 = 1, so
x1 = (x11, x
1
2, x
1
3, x
1
4, x
1
5) = (
3
5 ,
3
5 ,−25 ,−25 ,−25).
Step 2. Given the distribution x1 identiﬁed in Step 1 the following holds:
[vij + x1j ]i,j∈N =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
8
5
3
5 −25 −25 −25
8
5
8
5 −25 −25 −25
3
5
3
5
3
5 −25 −25
3
5
3
5
8
5
8
5 −25
3
5
3
5 −25 −25 135
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Thus, when we run Algorithm 1, agent 3 is ﬁrst included in N2 (because agent 3 is indiﬀerent
between objects 1, 2 and 3) and then agent 4 is included in N2 (because agent 4 is indiﬀerent
between objects 3 and 4). Hence, N2 = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Now, λ251 = λ252 = 2 and λ253 = λ253 = 3.
Thus, λ2 = 2, and as a consequence, x2 = (x21, x
2
2, x
2
3, x
2
4, x
2
5) = (1, 1, 0, 0,−2).
Step 3. By construction of x2, agent 5 is indiﬀerent between objects 1, 2 and 5 at allocation
(a, x2). Thus, N3 = N and Algorithm 2 terminates at Step 3. 
Appendix: Proofs
In the Appendix we prove Theorem 1, Theorem 2 and Theorem 3. The following two lemmas
will be useful.
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Lemma 7. Let ϕ be a budget-balanced and fair allocation rule. Let u ∈ U and (a, x) ∈ ϕ(u).
If the non-empty coalition G ⊆ N is isolated at allocation (a, x), then each C ⊆ G can
manipulate ϕ.
Proof. Let (a, x) ∈ ϕ(u), and suppose that G ⊆ N is a non-empty isolated coalition, i.e., that
both i →(a,x) j and uiai(x) > uiaj (x) for all i ∈ N − G and all j ∈ G. Now simultaneously
all compensations for objects ai (i ∈ G) can be increased by the same amount and all com-
pensations for objects aj (j ∈ N − G) can be decreased by the same amount without losing
budget-balance and fairness. Hence, there is a number τ > 0 and (a, y) ∈ F (u) such that
uiai(y) > uiai(x) + τ for all i ∈ G (and yai > xai + τ for all i ∈ G). Fix 0 < ε < τ and deﬁne
for any i ∈ G the function uˆi as follows: for all j ∈ M and all x′ ∈ RM , let
uˆij(x′) = (−yj + εij) + x′j , (6)
where εij = 0 if j = ai and εiai = ε > 0. Note that vˆij = −yj + εij . Let C ⊆ G and
uˆC = (uˆi)i∈C . By construction of uˆC , we have (a, y) ∈ F (uˆC , u−C).11
Let (b, z) ∈ ϕ(uˆC , u−C). We ﬁrst show bi = ai for all i ∈ C. Let δj = zj−yj for all j ∈ M .
Without loss of generality, order M such that δj ≥ δj+1 for all j = 1, . . . , |M | − 1.
If z = y, then by fairness, uˆibi(y) = uˆiai(y) for all i ∈ C. Since for all i ∈ C, uˆiai(y) = ε
and uˆij(y) = 0 for j = ai, we obtain bi = ai for all i ∈ C.
If z = y, then by budget-balance of both (b, z) and (a, y), δ1 > 0 and δn < 0. Let (jl)l be
a subsequence of (1, . . . , n) such that jl < jl+1, δjl > δjl+1 and δj = δjl if jl ≤ j < jl+1. Let
Sl = {i ∈ N | jl ≤ ai < jl+1}. Then for i ∈ Sl:
uiai(z) = uiai(y + δai) > uibi(y + δbi) = uibi(z) if bi ≥ jl+1 and i ∈ N − C,
uˆiai(z) = zai − yai + ε = δai + ε > δbi = uˆibi(z) if bi ≥ jl+1 and i ∈ C.
Thus, by fairness, for all l, i ∈ Sl implies jl ≤ bi < jl+1. Moreover, for i ∈ C, uˆiai(z) =
δai + ε > δbi = uˆibi(z) if bi = ai and bi ≥ jl. Hence, by fairness, bi = ai for all i ∈ C.
It remains to prove that uibi(z) > uiai(x) for all i ∈ C, i.e., ϕ is manipulable at u by
coalition C. From the above, we have ai = bi for all i ∈ C. Since ϕ is fair, we have
(b, z) ∈ F (uˆC , u−C). Now we have for all i ∈ C with bi = 1,
uˆibi(z) = uˆiai(z) = ziai − yiai + ε ≥ zi1 − yi1 = uˆi1(z). (7)
Because δj = zj − yj , it follows from the above condition that δbi ≥ δ1 − ε for i ∈ C with
bi = 1. Note that this inequality holds trivially if bi = 1 because ε > 0. Now this fact, the
deﬁnition of δj and our choice of 0 < ε < τ , δ1 ≥ 0 and ai = bi for all i ∈ C, yield for all
i ∈ C:
uiai(x) < uiai(y)− τ
= uibi(y)− τ
= vibi + zbi − (zbi − ybi)− τ
= uibi(z)− δbi − τ
≤ uibi(z)− δ1 − (τ − ε),
< uibi(z),
11Note that for all i ∈ C, uˆiai(y) = ε and uˆij(y) = 0 for j = ai.
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where the ﬁrst inequality follows from uiai(y) > uiai(x)+ τ , the ﬁrst equality from ai = bi for
i ∈ C, the second inequality from −δbi ≤ −(δ1 − ε), and the last inequality from δ1 ≥ 0 and
τ > ε. Hence, uiai(x) < uibi(z) for all i ∈ C, which is the desired conclusion.
Lemma 8. Let ϕ be a budget-balanced and fair allocation rule. Let u ∈ U and (a, x) ∈ ϕ(u).
Let N − G be a (possibly empty) isolated coalition with maximal cardinality at allocation
(a, x). Then G is an indiﬀerence component at allocation (a, x).
Proof. We ﬁrst show that all i, j ∈ G can be linked via an indiﬀerence chain in G. Suppose
not, i.e. there exist i, j ∈ G such that i cannot be linked to j via some indiﬀerence chain G.
Let H = {k ∈ G | k can be linked to j via some indiﬀerence chain in G}. Since i ∈ G −H,
we have G − H = ∅. Because no agent in G − H can be linked to any agent in H, now by
construction, it follows that the set (N − G) ∪H is isolated and |(N − G) ∪H| > |N − G|,
which contradicts the assumption that N−G is an isolated coalition with maximal cardinality
at allocation (a, x) ∈ ϕ(u).
Now, the proof follows directly because the coalition N −G is isolated at allocation (a, x),
i.e., i →(a,x) j for all i ∈ G and all j ∈ N −G. Consequently, there is no G′  G such that G′
is an indiﬀerence component by Deﬁnition 2.
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose that (a, x) ∈ ϕ(u) and (b, y) ∈ ψκ(u), and let N − G be
a (possibly empty) isolated coalition with maximal cardinality at allocation (a, x) ∈ ϕ(u).
Then G is an indiﬀerence component at allocations (a, x) and (b, y) by Lemma 3 and Lemma
8.
Note ﬁrst that all agents in the isolated coalition N −G can manipulate ϕ by Lemma 7.
Consequently, at least |N − G| agents can manipulate ϕ. Hence, to conclude the proof we
need to show that at most |N −G| agents can manipulate ψκ.
Suppose now that κ belongs to the indiﬀerence component Gˆ ⊆ G¯(u), and note that
|Gˆ| ≥ |G| by construction of ψκ. Since ψκ(u) ⊆ ψk(u) for all k ∈ Gˆ, it now follows from
Lemma 5 that no agent k ∈ Gˆ can manipulate ψκ at proﬁle u. Thus, at most |N − Gˆ| agents
can manipulate ψκ. The conclusion then follows directly from the observation that |Gˆ| ≥ |G|
implies |N − Gˆ| ≤ |N −G|. 
Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose that (a, x) ∈ ϕ(u) and (b, y) ∈ ψκ(u), and let N − G be
the (possibly empty) isolated coalition with maximal cardinality at allocation (a, x) ∈ ϕ(u).
Then G is an indiﬀerence component at allocations (a, x) and (b, y) by Lemma 3 and Lemma
8.
Note ﬁrst that all coalitions in the isolated group N −G can manipulate ϕ by Lemma 7.
Consequently, at least 2|N−G| − 1 coalitions can manipulate ϕ. Hence, to conclude the proof
we need to show that at most 2|N−G| − 1 coalitions can manipulate ψκ. Suppose now that
κ belongs to the indiﬀerence component Gˆ ⊆ G¯(u), and note that |Gˆ| ≥ |G| by construction
of ψκ. It now follows from Lemma 5 and the construction of ψκ that at most 2|N−Gˆ| − 1
coalitions can manipulate ψκ. The conclusion then follows directly from the observation that
|Gˆ| ≥ |G| implies |N | − |Gˆ| ≤ |N | − |G|. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Note ﬁrst that the adjustment of the compensation vector at Step t
from xt−1 to xt respects the balanced budget requirement by construction of xt because:
∑
i∈N
xtai =
∑
i∈N
xt−1ai −
|N t|
|N | · λ
t · |N −N t|+ |N −N
t|
|N | · λ
t · |N t| =
∑
i∈N
xt−1ai ,
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and allocation (a, x0) is budget-balanced.
The adjustment of the compensation vector at Step t from xt−1 to xt also respects fairness
because the assignment a is held constant and the construction of xt guarantees that if
uiai(x
t−1) ≥ uiaj (xt−1) then uiai(xt) ≥ uiaj (xt). If i, j ∈ N t or i, j ∈ N − N t this follows
directly since the adjustments of xt−1ai and x
t−1
aj are identical. In the case when i ∈ N t
and j ∈ N − N t, the result follows since xt−1ai is increased and xt−1aj is decreased. In the
last case when i ∈ N − N t and j ∈ N t, the conclusion follows by deﬁnition of λt and
λtij = uiai(x
t−1)− uiaj (xt−1), i.e.:
uiai(x
t) = viai + x
t
ai = viai + x
t−1
ai −
|N t|
|N | · λ
t ≥ viai + xt−1ai −
|N t|
|N | · λ
t
ij =
= uiai(x
t−1)− λtij +
|N −N t|
|N | · λ
t
ij = uiaj (x
t−1) +
|N −N t|
|N | · λ
t
iaj
≥ viaj + xt−1aj +
|N −N t|
|N | · λ
t = viaj + x
t
aj = uiaj (x
t).
Thus, at Step t in the algorithm (a, xt) satisﬁes budget-balance and fairness. It remains
to prove that the algorithm terminates in at most |N | iterations at an agent k-linked fair
allocation.
By construction of N t, each agent i ∈ N t must belong to an indiﬀerence chain G =
{i, ..., k}. Note that at Step t, for i ∈ N − N t and j ∈ N t such that λtij = λt, all the above
inequalities become equalities and we obtain uiai(x
t) = uiaj (x
t), i →(a,xt) j and i ∈ N t+1.
Note that N t ⊆ N t+1 because for any i, j ∈ N t such that i →(a,xt−1) j we also have i →(a,xt) j.
Thus, |N t+1| − |N t| ≥ 1 as long as N − N t = ∅. Now it is clear that the algorithm will
terminate in at most |N | number of iterations and that the resulting fair allocation is agent
k−linked. 
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